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Abstract
Latin American countries have been in the eye of economic and ¯nancial storms
several times in recent years. Advice from the International Monetary Fund has
consistently highlighted the need for sound ¯scal policies and lower debt levels. But
is public debt relevant? Following a brief discussion of the theoretical issues involved,
this paper examines empirically the relationship between public indebtedness and
pressures in the foreign exchange market. Alternative measures are used to capture
the latter and the analysis controls for a de facto classi¯cation of exchange rate regimes.
Estimations of static and dynamic panels for 28 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)
countries report substantial ¯scal e®ects.
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Macroeconomic imbalances culminating in economic crises have been a common feature
of many Latin American economies. As a continent, Latin America has a long history
of ¯scal de¯cits and unsustainable debt ratios, monetary excesses, rapid in°ation and
severe balance of payments problems (Cardoso and Helwege, 1992, Bird and Helwege,
1994). Frequently these have resulted in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) becoming
involved and o®ering advice about the design of economic policy.
In the 1970s, the oil crisis conferred some bene¯ts on oil exporting Latin American
economies but imposed costs on oil importers. In the 1980s, the whole region was a®ected
by the Third World debt crisis, which was, in fact, very much a Latin American phe-
nomenon. In the 1990s, there was the Mexican crisis in 1994, with its overspill e®ects on
other countries in the region, followed by the crises in Ecuador in 1998 and in Brazil in
1999. In the early 2000s, there have been crises in Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay as
well as in other Latin American economies. Again, the IMF has been heavily involved.
It was largely with Latin American economies in mind that the ¯rst generation currency
crisis model (Krugman, 1979) was formulated although both second (e.g. Obstfeld, 1996)
and third generation crisis models (e.g. Corsetti et al., 1999) also have something to
say about crises in the region. Certainly theoretical models of currency crises and their
contagion e®ects have found ample application in Latin America.
Against this background, our paper sets itself a modest objective. We aim to exam-
ine empirically the association between public debt and foreign exchange (FX) market
pressures. Following debt default episodes that have had serious rami¯cations for the
FX market, the importance of the stock of debt has received renewed attention. How-
ever, despite the focus on ¯scal policy and debt reduction, those who believe in Ricardian
equivalence have continued to doubt the relevance of debt.
According to this line of thinking higher debt today implies a higher tax-burden to-
morrow. Anticipating this, rational agents save an amount equal to the increase in debt
thereby o®setting any expansionary macroeconomic e®ects. If accurate, the con¯dence
of foreign investors in the domestic currency should not be adversely a®ected. If inaccu-
rate, debt accumulation may undermine con¯dence and lead to pressure on the domestic
currency in the foreign exchange market.
1The lay out of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brie°y explores the theoretical issues
involved in the association between public debt and pressures in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. The next section discusses features of the LAC region's sovereign market. Following
a discussion of the data and methodology in Section 4, Section 5 examines whether a
higher stock of debt is empirically linked to increased FX market pressures. The analysis
is carried out in a panel data framework consisting of Latin American and Caribbean
economies. We also examine whether this relationship is a®ected by the nature of the
chosen exchange rate regime using the classi¯cation recently suggested by Reinhart and
Rogo® (2004). Other control variables capture the e®ects of external factors (notably the
US interest rate) and monetary factors (e.g. domestic credit to the private sector). Since
our emphasis is on the e®ects of ¯scal policy on the domestic currency rather than its
persistent e®ects on relative prices we use the nominal rather than the real exchange rate
to gauge conditions in the FX market. Section 6 o®ers concluding remarks.
2 Does Debt Matter?
Although this paper is primarily empirical, it may be helpful to consider what theory
leads us to anticipate about the relationship between public debt and foreign exchange
market pressure. The literature on the macroeconomics of public debt o®ers a number
of broad scenarios depending on contingent circumstances. The Ricardian equivalence
theorem suggests that the e®ects of ¯scal de¯cits ¯nanced by debt are no di®erent from
those ¯nanced by additional taxation, since rational non-myopic agents anticipate the
eventual increase in taxation and therefore increase saving in order to cover future tax
obligations. However, this result depends on a number of restrictive assumptions; taxes
are lump sum and do not a®ect incentives, households have in¯nite horizons (or engage
in intergenerational transfers), there is certainty about future levels of public spending,
interest rates and income, and capital markets are perfect.
Keynesian theory, in contrast, assumes that agents are myopic and base their consump-
tion on current disposable income. Within a Keynesian framework, changes in the level
of debt have di®erent implications than changes in taxation because they have di®erent
e®ects on disposable income, as well as on interest rates. More detailed investigations
into the e®ects of debt may be found in, for example, Barro (1974 and 1979), Elmendorf
2and Mankiw (1998), Seater (1993), and Buiter and Kletzer (1991, 1992). Although these
studies are more widely de¯ned, they implicitly o®er a number of, sometimes con°icting,
routes through which public debt may a®ect the foreign exchange market and the demand
for and supply of a country's currency. E®ects working through income, interest rates and
wealth may be important, but much ultimately depends on whether investors see debt lev-
els as being sustainable. This in turn will, in part, depend on what they anticipate about
private saving and a government's capacity to raise future taxation, as well as the more
general e®ects of debt on economic performance. For example, an increase in debt may
be seen as more sustainable where it leads to a compensating increase in private saving,
can be serviced by increased taxation and does not adversly a®ect economic growth.
In this paper we make no attempt to formally model and estimate the various chan-
nels through which debt may in°uence foreign exchange market pressure. However, we
do surmise from the inherited theory mentioned above that in a Latin American con-
text, debt build-up will be non-neutral and is likely to have an adverse e®ect on market
pressure. The assumptions upon which Ricardian equivalence is based are generally unre-
alistic for the region. For example, debt build up may shift spending power to poor groups
which have a relatively high propensity to consume, and would otherwise face liquidity
constraints. Moreover, saving rates are notoriously low and di±cult to increase, taxable
capacity is relatively in°exible and the reputation of many countries in the region over the
protracted period of this study may be expected to have inspired little con¯dence about
future macroeconomic management. Our a priori assumption is therefore that larger lev-
els of public debt will have exerted an adverse e®ect on market con¯dence and on foreign
exchange market pressures. However, theory also suggests that these pressures could be
a®ected by contingent conditions. Of particular interest is the nature of the exchange rate
regime. Again in principle the relationship is ambiguous. For example, a commitment to
maintaining a pegged exchange rate may anchor expectations and exert a bene¯cial e®ect.
But it may also imply that debt will be less easily sustained since one potentially impor-
tant instrument is being ruled out. Flexible exchange rates may reinstate this instrument
but may, at the same time, create another avenue via which the sustainability of external
debt is undermined because of balance sheet and other related e®ects.

























































































































































































































































































Percentage of Long-Term Debt in USD
Short-term Debt (% Total Debt)
344.5 314.2
Figure 1: Size, Maturity and Denomination of LAC Debt, Averages 1970{2000
debt relative to international reserves makes crises more probable and this also leads us
to anticipate that increasing levels of public debt will tend to create additional pressures
in the foreign exchange market.1
3 The Latin American and Caribbean Sovereign Market
Latin American and Caribbean economies averaged a debt ratio of 68.8 percent of gross
national income in the period 1970{2000. The cross-sectional mean, however, can poten-
tially be a deceptive measure of average indebtedness in the presence of extreme values in
the sample. In this case, it seems that the level of borrowing by Guyana and Nicaragua
(with mean debt ratios of 314% and 344%, respectively) is uncharacteristic of the region
and biases the LAC countries' average upwards; the median value for the region as a whole
is a considerably lower 42.2%. The dark columns in ¯gure 1 depict mean debt values for
1This of course highlights the importance of international reserves. See Jeanne and Ranciµ ere (2006) for
a recent discussion on their optimal level.
4Table 1: Currency Composition of Latin America's Debt { 5-Year Averages
1970-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00
Deutsche Mark 3.28 3.25 2.29 3.17 3.47 2.87
French Franc 1.11 1.15 1.23 2.11 2.85 1.92
Japanese Yen 0.45 2.45 2.55 4.73 6.34 5.13
British Pound 13.41 7.30 4.32 5.74 4.91 2.45
Swiss Franc 0.76 0.62 0.43 0.57 0.37 0.19
US Dollar 59.99 60.63 63.32 56.50 55.21 67.69
SDR 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.49 0.51 0.49
Multiple curr. 15.54 16.30 17.42 21.11 21.96 14.88
All other curr. 5.46 8.30 8.08 5.58 4.39 4.38
Notes: Values are percent of long-term debt. All columns add up to 100. Source: Global Development Finance.
the countries in the sample (the mean is an appropriate measure of average indebtedness
for the individual time series in our dataset). It can be readily seen that, with the ex-
ception of a few economies, debt levels in the LAC region are not excessively high (e.g.
compared to some OECD economies).
A notable di®erence between LAC and OECD economies is that the former typically
borrow in foreign currency {and especially in US dollars{ and, hence, total debt is essen-
tially the same as external debt. As Tovar (2005) notes, about 40% of Latin American
bonds are international issues and nearly all of them are in a foreign currency.2 Table 1
reports 5-year averages for the sample period of the currency composition of the LAC
region's debt liabilities. Despite some variations over time, most of these liabilities are
denominated in US dollars {see the grey columns in ¯gure 1 on the preceding page. Other
popular currencies for denominating debt over the period we studied were the Japanese
Yen, the Deutsche Mark, the French Franc and the British Pound.
In terms of the maturity structure of debt, the average for the region is about 21 years,
ranging from an average of 10 years for Venezuela to almost 60 years for El Salvador. The
white columns in ¯gure 1 show the percentage of total external debt that is classi¯ed as
short-term. In most cases, this amount does not exceed one tenth of the total issues in
place.3 LAC countries borrowed on average at an interest rate of 6.7%. Argentina and
2A move towards introducing a domestic currency bond market has recently been implemented by
Uruguay, Colombia and Brazil. For a discussion, again see Tovar (2005). In the growing debate about
the need to introduce local currency markets in emerging economies, Levy-Yeyati (2007) proposes the
issuance of domestic currency bonds by international ¯nancial institutions with the proceeds being used
to dedollarize their own loans to these economies.
3The de¯nition of short-term debt here includes external liabilities with a maturity of less than one
5Brazil seem to have been discriminated against by investors with higher interest rates
(8.3% and 8.6% respectively), despite the fact that their debt ratios have been amongst
the lowest in the sample (38.5% and 30.9%). However, Brazil ran ¯scal de¯cits of 4.9%
of GDP on average and Argentina had amongst the highest rates of increase in its debt
ratio.4
4 Data and Methodology
As noted in the introduction, the main objective of this paper is to measure the importance
of public debt in determining the extent to which LAC countries are exposed to pressures
in the FX market. Our focus is on this region, since it has faced severe crisis episodes
over a protracted period (e.g. Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001). We need to clarify
here that we do not focus on `crises' as such but rather adopt the wider concept of `FX
pressures' (detailed later in this section). Unlike the discrete binary variables usually seen
in probit and logit estimations, our FX pressure measures are continuous variables. The
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to extract more information from the data.5
Our data are from the Global Development Finance (GDF), World Development Indi-
cators (WDI) and International Financial Statistics (IFS) databases. The panel contains
information on a wide range of macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables for the countries
represented in the Latin American and Caribbean region classi¯cation of the GDF.6 The
time span of the dataset is from 1970 to 2000. As the number of observations available
for individual variables di®ers from country to country, our panel dataset is unbalanced.
The chosen methodology is to estimate static and dynamic panels through least squares
dummy variables (LSDV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) respectively (for
the latter, see Arellano and Bond, 1991). Given the endogeneity issues that are present, we
also estimate the static panel using instrumental variables. Cross-sectional regressions are
too restrictive, as averaging the observations over time would prevent us from uncovering
interesting dynamics and, in any case, are not appropriate for the analysis of crises. At
year. As a result, quite heavy concentrations of maturities in the region of 1 to 5 years are not included.
This de¯nition is in line with international practice.
4Variable descriptive statistics for individual countries are not reported in the tables due to space
considerations. The dataset is available from the authors upon request.
5We do however construct a binary crisis index for comparison purposes; see section 5.
6See Appendix 1 for a list of countries.
6the same time, given the low frequency of debt-related information and the relatively
small time window for which this information is available, time series data for individual
countries may lead to unreliable results. In contrast, panel estimations utilize better the
available information and allow us to investigate heterogeneity; in other words, we can
test for di®erent intercept/slope coe±cients across countries, or over time, or both.7 In
this paper, we con¯ne ourselves to testing for cross-country variation of the intercept, as
it is an intuitive exercise without the complications that arise from slope heterogeneity
tests.
We now turn to the choice of a market pressure index (MPI) as our dependent variable.
The use of MPIs is quite common in the literature. Building on the theoretical under-
pinnings of Girton and Roper (1977) several variations of the index have appeared in the
crisis/contagion literature (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1995). The MPI we construct consists
of the ¯rst di®erence of the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate against the US
dollar plus the ¯rst di®erence of the natural logarithm of the domestic interest rate minus
the negative of the ¯rst di®erence of the natural logarithm of international reserves.8 The
weights assigned to the component variables are determined by the corresponding ratios
of one over the standard deviation of each variable divided by the sum of all three ratios.
This weighting scheme means that a few extreme episodes (e.g. a large increase in the
interest rate) cannot dominate the index. In other words, a standard deviation assuming
a very high value because of extreme volatility of the variable to which it relates will
automatically lead to a smaller weight being allocated to that variable in the index.
In this study we in fact use four measures of FX pressure to check whether our re-
sults are sensitive to the particular index used. In addition to the above-mentioned index
(mpi1), we use a more basic variation (mpi2), which excludes interest rates.9 This omis-
sion substantially increases the sample size. We also use the changes in the natural log of
the o±cial exchange rate with the US dollar (dlxr). Finally, we use the in°ation di®eren-
tial with the United States (infdif ); if we are prepared to assume that PPP holds in the
7Large sample studies can be useful in identifying potential crisis-triggering factors. However, pooling
observations from regions with di®erent economic, historical and structural characteristics puts in question
the general applicability of the model's implications. Hence, there is a need to warrant some homogeneity
in the sample {see Bird and Mandilaras (2006).
8Data are from the IFS.
9In fact, Girton and Roper's (1977) index did not include interest rates.
7Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the FX Pressure Indices
mpi1 mpi2 dlxr infdif
Mean 0.921 2.222 20.345 8.133
Median 0.188 -0.108 1.561 5.092
Max. 56.625 143.519 787.389 47.728
Min. -89.067 -105.664 -487.828 -15.122
St. Dev. 15.068 20.749 60.048 10.775
Obs. 458 677 840 689
Notes: Data are from the IFS. Variables mpi1 and mpi2 are FX market pressure indices, dlxr is the change in the
natural log of the nominal exchange rate against the US dollar and infdif is the in°ation di®erential with the US.
short run, this gives us an indication of devaluation expectations.10
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our measures of market pressure. Figure 2
shows their average values across all LAC countries at each point in time. It can be
observed that on average LAC currencies were depreciating throughout the sample and
in°ation di®erentials were high, particularly in the 1980s. The pressure indices, which
gauge conditions in the FX market more comprehensively, also show mounting pressures
in the 1980s. The correlations between the pressure indices are high (the correlation
coe±cient between them is 68%). They are also high between the in°ation di®erential and
the depreciation rate (71%). However, the links between the MPIs and infdif and dlxr
appear weaker, with correlations in the vicinity of 25-50%.
Our list of potential determinants of FX pressures includes a range of ¯scal indicators
(e.g. the debt ratio, maturity structure indicators), which form the focus of this paper. In
addition, it includes variables and macroeconomic indicators for which the theory and the
literature suggest there is an expected degree of relevance to FX pressures.11 For example,
we have used measures of monetary aggregates (consistent with ¯rst generation models),
unemployment (consistent with second generation models) and measures of the banking
system's health (consistent with third generation models). Table 3 lists the variables in the
dataset. The equation we eventually ¯t to the data meets criteria of parsimony, intuitive
relevance and statistical reliability.
An important aspect of this paper is to examine whether the type of exchange rate
10Given the hyperin°ation incidents in some LAC countries several observations have extremely high
values. To prevent these from a®ecting the results the estimations exclude values of the in°ation di®erential
exceeding 50%.
11Empirical studies of currency crises include Sachs et al. (1996), Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky
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Figure 2: Mean Values of the FX Pressure Indices, 1970{2000
regime is associated with FX market pressures. It is widely accepted that o±cial classi¯-
cations of exchange rate regimes are not su±ciently accurate to portray the actual policies
followed by central banks. Here, we follow Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) and use their
`coarse' index of de facto exchange rate regimes. The index ranges from 1 to 6 {see Table
4{ progressively allowing for more °exibility. From this index, we have constructed two
dummy variables: for the ¯rst one, ¯xed, the value 1 has been assigned to the cases of no
separate legal tender, pre announced pegs or currency board arrangements, pre announced
horizontal bands that are narrower than or equal to +/-2% and de facto pegs. For the
second one, intermed, the value 1 is allocated to de facto or pre announced crawling pegs,
de facto or pre announced crawling bands that are narrower than or equal to +/-5%,
moving bands that are narrower than or equal to +/-2%, and managed °oats.12
12Reinhart and Rogo®'s (2004) is not the only e®ort to classify exchange rate regimes. Using cluster
9Table 3: List of Variables Used in the Analysis
Fiscal
avgmat Average external debt maturity in years
budget Budget balance (% GDP)
concess Concessional debt (% Total debt)
debt°gni Total net °ows of debt (% GNI)
debtpriv Private non-guaranteed debt (% Total debt)
debtgni Total Debt (% GNI)
debtst°gni Net °ows of short-term debt (% GNI)
stdebtratio Short-term debt (% Total debt)
stint Short-term interest payments (% GDP)
ocom Commitments o±cial creditors (% GDP)
pcom Commitments private creditors (% GDP)
ltdebt Total long term debt outstanding (% GDP)
Monetary
bnkres Bank liquid reserves (% bank assets)
dcreb Domestic credit from banks (% GDP)
dcrep Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP)
dom¯n Domestic ¯nancing (% GDP)
m2gdp M2 (% GDP)
Other Macro
ca Current account balance (% GNI)
exports Exports of goods and services in constant 1995 dollars
fdi Net foreign direct investment (% GNI)
¯ncons Final consumption in in constant 1995 dollars
gdp GDP at constant 1995 dollars
gdpcap GDP per capita at constant 1995 dollars
unempl Unemployment rate
External
usirate Federal funds rate
Exchange rate regime
¯xed Dummy variable capturing ¯xed exchange rate regimes
intermed Dummy variable capturing intermediate exchange rate regimes
Notes: Data are from the GDF and the WDI. The dummy variables ¯xed and intermedhave been constructed using
data from Reinhart and Rogo® (2004).
The patterns in the data are interesting. According to the mpi1 measure greater ex-
change rate °exibility is associated with increasing FX pressure. Fixers face less pressure
than °oaters. Similar results are found in the case of mpi2, although here there appears to
be less pressure under freely °oating rates than under managed °oating or pre-announced/
de facto crawling bands and moving bands. Fixed exchange rate regimes are associated
with falling in°ation rate di®erentials whereas °exible regimes are associated with increas-
ing in°ation di®erentials with the US.13
analysis, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) classify regimes as °oating, intermediate or ¯xed. The
correlation between our intermed variable and theirs is very low, possibly because of the small number
of regimes that they identify as dirty °oats or crawling pegs (i.e. intermediate) in the LAC sample. The
correlation is almost 60% between the ¯xed regime dummies.
13This is a rather di®erent conclusion than that drawn by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) who investigate
crisis episodes based on severe exchange market pressure across a broad range of countries during 1990-
2001. They ¯nd that pegged regimes exhibit a higher incidence of crisis than °oating regimes. They also
¯nd that intermediate regimes are more crisis-prone than either of the extremes, giving some support to
the bi-polar view, although they suggest that `the support is not as overwhelming as one would expect',
p 19. They point out that the importance of the exchange rate regime can be overstated and that it is
inconsistencies between this and other policies that make countries vulnerable to speculative attack. Our
10Table 4: De Facto Classi¯cation of Exchange Rate Regimes
1 No separate legal tender
1 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
1 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
1 De facto peg
2 Pre announced crawling peg
2 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
2 De facto crawling peg
2 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
3 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
3 De facto crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-5%




6 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing
Notes: Source: Reinhart and Rogo®, 2004.
5 Econometric Estimation
As discussed previously, the panel methodology involving continuous measures of FX pres-
sures enables us to explain movements in the FX markets without the need to classify
observations as crisis/non-crisis. In this section we undertake an econometric investiga-
tion of the relationship between debt and FX pressures in Latin America and Caribbean
countries. The static restricted pooled model is of the form
yit = ´ + ¯0Xit + Àit
with zero mean and constant variance. This model is tested against an unrestricted model
that allows the intercept to vary across countries:
yit = ´i + ¯0Xit + Àit
The Â2 and F tests (not reported) clearly reject the restriction and hence we estimate
a least squares dummy variable model with ¯xed country e®ects. The choice of ¯xed
over random e®ects is not always uncontroversial. In our case, the Hausman statistics
results are consistent with this view.
11clearly indicate that the ¯xed e®ects formulation should be used. In addition, our choice
of countries is not purely random; Latin American countries may share some characteris-
tics and in these circumstances a random formulation of country-speci¯c e®ects may be
inappropriate.
By eliminating the insigni¯cant variables (Table 3 on page 10 lists all the variables
used) we end up with a vector of variables Xit that contains: (a) the debt to GNI ratio (as
a measure of ¯scal stance), (b) the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector relative
to GDP (as a measure of monetary conditions), (c) two dummy variables capturing the
¯xed and intermediate regimes as classi¯ed by Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) and (d) the US
interest rate (as an indicator of external conditions). Results are reported in Table 5.
The LSDV estimator of the (unbalanced) panel, which is corrected for heteroscedastic-
ity in each panel and cross-country correlation, reports a positive sign for variable debtgni;
this shows that high debt ratios are associated with increased FX pressures. It is notewor-
thy that the positive sign and the signi¯cance of the estimated coe±cient do not depend
on the choice of the dependent variable; in other words, the result remains unchanged
irrespective of whether we estimate the panel with mpi1, mpi2, dlxr or infdif on the left-
hand side. There is evidence that those dealing in the FX market have less con¯dence in
the currencies of high debt countries.
The two regime dummies are negatively associated with FX pressures. The estimated
coe±cient of ¯xed is in all estimations higher in absolute value than the estimated coef-
¯cient of intermed. The latter, however, is statistically signi¯cant at greater con¯dence
levels. In any case, the results indicate that some sort of ¯x or management of the cur-
rency leads to reduced FX pressures. Increases in the US interest rate lead to higher FX
pressure in LAC countries. As investors can get a better return than before in the US
they repatriate assets leading to pressures on LAC currencies. The estimated coe±cient,
however, is only signi¯cant when we use the mpi1 and mpi2 on the left-hand side. The
results regarding domestic credit to the private sector are mixed. A credit expansion is
indicative of lax monetary conditions that should lead to FX pressure. However, we only
get the right sign (and a signi¯cant parameter) in the estimation involving mpi1.
A valid criticism of the above results regarding the equation with mpi1 could be
the possible endogeneity of the debt variable. As mpi1 includes the domestic interest
12Table 5: LSDV, IV and GMM Estimation Results
mpi1 mpi2 dlxr infdif
Panel A: LSDV
debtgni 0.025* 0.05** 0.202* 0.0175*
(0.009) (0.021) (0.053) (0.006)
usirate 1.231* 0.717** 0.677 0.03
(0.317) (0.341) (0.856) (0.198)
intermed -3.543* -5.248* -19.716* -5.237*
(1.22) (1.119) (3.232) (0.535)
¯xed -6.615*** -16.007* -45.048* -20.178*
(3.873) (3.418) (10.006) (1.602)
domcrp 0.148*** -0.036 -0.19 -0.177*
(0.082) (0.099) (0.245) (0.034)
const. -7.698*** 7.346 45.174* 27.692*
(4.476) (4.773) (11.096) (2.676)
Panel B: IV
debtgni 0.019*** 0.046*** 0.15** 0.014**
(0.011) (0.025) (0.065) (0.006)
usirate 1.054* 0.737** 0.65 0.017
(0.331) (0.356) (0.928) (0.198)
intermed -3.671* -5.308* -20.11* -5.183*
(1.231) (1.14) (3.314) (0.527)
¯xed -6.72*** -16.373* -48.764* -20.044*
(3.956) (3.625) (10.746) (1.59)
domcrp 0.152*** -0.034 -0.137 -0.186*
(0.083) (0.1) (0.246) (0.034)
const. -6.097 7.652 49.268 28.304*
(4.605) (4.935) (11.929) (2.667)
Panel C: GMM
Lagged Dependent 0.138*** -0.024 0.222** 0.358*
(0.071) (0.07) (0.107) (0.041)
debtgni 0.022** 0.02*** 0.095*** -0.007**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.053) (0.003)
usirate -2.832 4.162 15.330 0.639***
(4.953) (3.773) (17.054) (0.366)
intermed -2.853*** -4.862** -22.18* -4.588*
(1.493) (2.375) (3.932) (0.989)
¯xed -4.982 -15.533** -51.155* -15.473*
(6.264) (6.858) (13.838) (2.112)
domcrp 0.364** 0.208 0.453 -0.033
(0.167) (0.203) (0.34) (0.05)
Notes: Panel A reports least squares dummy variable results of unbalanced panels with ¯xed e®ects. The standard
errors of the estimates (reported in parentheses) are corrected for time-varying variances in each country and
contemporaneous correlation. Intercepts vary across countries and are not reported. Panel B reports two-stage least
squares results with debtgni instrumented with its lag. Standard errors are corrected as above. Panel C reports
1-step White period GMM results of unbalanced panels with period dummies. Independent variables are in ¯rst
di®erences (except from the exchange rate regime dummies). The maximum number of GMM instruments for the
dependent variable and debtgni is 5. (*) indicates signi¯cance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent and (***)
at the 10 percent level. The ¯rst three decimal digits are reported.
13rate it is possible that a rate increase worsens the debt burden and, hence, the positive
association between the index and debtgni runs from the interest rate to the debt variable.
To deal with this potential problem we estimate the equation with two-stage least squares
instrumenting debtgni with its one-period lag. The results (reported in panel B of Table
5) remain virtually unchanged, alleviating fears of endogeneity. The endogenous negative
relationship between domestic credit and the interest rate is not a reason for great concern,
as the coe±cient of domcrp in the mpi1 equation is positive {if anything it will be slightly
underestimated. This is con¯rmed if, in addition to debtgni, we instrument domcrp with
its lag: the positive association is not disturbed, but the coe±cient increases by 20% to
0.186. The mpi2 and dlxr measures do not contain interest rates and, hence, the above
discussion is not applicable for these cases. However, the case of infdif is di®erent, as it is
correlated with the domestic interest rate. The signi¯cant negative coe±cient reported in
this case is likely to be the negative e®ect of an increase in domestic credit on the interest
rate.
According to the estimations so far reported, rising public debt appears to increase
FX pressure. But does this seemingly strong result hold in a dynamic speci¯cation? In
other words, what happens if FX pressures persist? We address this question using the
dynamic speci¯cation
yit = ®yi;t¡1 + ¯0(L)Xit + ´i + Àit
where ¯0(L) is a vector of polynomials in the lag operator (in our case there is one lag).14
The GMM estimator is a function of an instrument matrix that contains lags for the
dependent variable and ¯rst di®erences for the independent variables. The equation is
estimated in ¯rst di®erences (the regime dummies remain untransformed). Panel C of
Table 5 reports the results.
Using the same set of independent variables as in the static analysis, but with the
addition of the lagged dependent variable, we ¯nd strong support for the results obtained
earlier. The lagged di®erence of the dependent variable is positively associated with FX
pressures in three of the four estimated equations. The sign is in all cases positive indi-
cating that pressures persist. Debt, as expected, exerts a signi¯cant in°uence over FX
14The choice of lag is based on the fact that one would not expect higher-order lags given the annual
frequency of the data.
14pressures in all four regressions. Undoubtedly, public debt is an important determinant
of pressures in the FX market, hence casting doubt on the relevance of Ricardian equiva-
lence in the context of LAC countries. The US interest rate generally loses its explanatory
power in this dynamic setting. The intermed and ¯xed exchange rate regime dummies
are in most cases signi¯cant and have the expected sign. Domestic credit to GDP has the
expected sign but a signi¯cant coe±cient only in the mpi1 regression.
To cross-check these results further we have also performed an ordinary probit anal-
ysis. Using the basic mpi1 variable we have assigned a value of 1 when an observation
exceeds the average plus 1.5 times the standard deviation (within a country). All other
observations are assigned a 0 value. This procedure creates a `crisis variable'.15 Using
the same speci¯cation we ¯nd that the US interest rate and exchange rate regimes have
the expected signs and are statistically signi¯cant. The debt variable is positive but in-
signi¯cant. However, when we take the ¯rst di®erence (i.e. when we examine `°ow' rather
than `stock' e®ects) debt becomes signi¯cant at the 10 percent level. The coe±cient for
domestic credit enters the non-linear equation with a negative sign, possibly driven by the
endogenous negative relationship between domestic credit and the interest rate used in
the construction of the mpi1.
The analysis of this section has provided comprehensive evidence that ¯scal policies
and related levels of public debt play an important role in determining FX pressures. The
intuition is that high levels of debt may trigger a `°ight of capital' {or `sudden stop'{ if
investors perceive a threat to debt repayments.16 It may be in the context of the associated
capital account crisis that the IMF provides ¯nancial support. The provision of liquidity
may restore con¯dence in the short term. Indeed by providing emergency ¯nance the Fund
may be able to prevent a crisis in one country spilling over to other countries in the region,
as was envisaged in its abortive Contingent Credit Lines. However, our results also suggest
that the Fund should, in addition, exert pressure on countries to deal with the underlying
causes of crisis in terms of ¯scal de¯cits and debt accumulation. Our results therefore
15The GAUSS programs for this binary transformation as well as for the calculation of the market
pressure indices are available from the authors upon request.
16The fact that the LAC area's liabilities are dollarized makes real depreciations {which normally ensue
such incidents{ more painful. More closed economies need sharper real exchange rate increases; and with
the combination of dollar liabilities and local currency assets (liabilities' mismatching) the balance sheets
of the government and private ¯rms su®er. This is a second round of a sudden stop following the original
shock {see Calvo et al. (2003).
15build a bridge between ¯rst and third generation currency crisis models, since it may be
that the accumulation of debt, making countries vulnerable to a capital account crisis, as
emphasized in the third generation model, have their origins in ¯scal de¯cits, as stressed in
the ¯rst generation model. We have opted for a stock approach of ¯scal e®ects, as opposed
to a °ow approach, to highlight the cumulative e®ects of de¯cits. LAC countries need to
aim for debt levels that are sustainable. The problem is that the sustainable level of debt
may actually be substantially lower than the observed debt ratios in LAC countries (see
Mendoza and Oviedo, 2004). In the next section we discuss some of the issues arising from
the need to reduce the debt burden.
6 Concluding Remarks
Having brie°y explored the theoretical issues in the relationship between public debt and
pressures in the foreign exchange market, the empirical results presented in this paper
suggest that higher debt levels have indeed led to increased foreign exchange market pres-
sures in Latin America and the Caribbean. We also ¯nd that ¯xed and intermediate
exchange rate regimes lead to lower market pressure. Our analysis implies that, in its
dealings with Latin American countries, the IMF has been right to emphasize the impor-
tance of ¯scal policy but may be wrong to push for free exchange rate °exibility, unless
other macroeconomic imbalances are reduced.
But it is much easier to identify in broad terms what needs to be done in order to
help achieve a given objective than it is to design a detailed policy strategy that will
deliver it. Fiscal de¯cits and debt accumulation are the consequence of a complex matrix
of domestic and external economic and political factors. Just to say that they should be
reduced without seeking to understand why they are there in the ¯rst place is unlikely to
be a successful approach. Governments will encounter political constraints that limit their
degree of freedom in terms of policy design. Improving tax administration may take a long
time, and external shocks may blow o® course whatever strategy has been embarked upon.
It is di±cult to think of issues that are more highly politically charged than taxation and
government expenditure.17
17Just consider some of the issues. There are problems of taxable capacity and tax administration which
may take a long time to remedy. Increasing marginal tax rates may lead to more evasion and lower tax
16On top of this, there is the complicated, and as yet insu±ciently understood, rela-
tionship between ¯scal de¯cits and economic growth. Given these considerations it is
unsurprising to ¯nd that many programs supported by the IMF in Latin America fail to
achieve their ¯scal targets (Bulir and Moon, 2003, Hutchison and Noy, 2003).18 Knowing
what to do is much di®erent from being able to do it.19
References
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991): \Some Tests of Speci¯cation for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic
Studies, 58, 287{297.
Barro, R. J. (1974): \Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 82(6), 1095{1117.
(1979): \On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 87(5), 940{971.
Bird, G., and A. Helwege (eds.) (1994): Latin America's Economic Future. Academic
Press, London.
Bird, G., and A. Mandilaras (2006): \Regional Heterogeneity in the Relationship be-
tween Fiscal Imbalances and Foreign Exchange Market Pressure," World Development,
34, 1171{81.
Bubula, A., and I. Otker-Robe (2003): \Are Pegged and Intermediate Regimes More
Crisis Prone?," Working Paper 03/223, IMF.
revenue. Using Value Added Tax and expenditure taxes may tend to be regressive. Similarly cutting some
elements of government expenditure such as health and education may have a particularly adverse e®ect on
the poor. Cutting subsidies is likely to generate political resistance from those who bene¯ted from them,
as will cuts in the wages of government employees. The combination of increases in VAT and reductions
in social expenditure will have adverse consequences for income distribution which may result in political
instability, which in turn makes it di±cult to implement ¯scal adjustment.
18This then creates yet another policy conundrum. If it is di±cult to control ¯scal de¯cits, do govern-
ments really want to give up the option of altering the exchange rate? A theoretically ¯rst best world may
di®er substantially from the real world which politicians inhabit.
19For a clear and comprehensive discussion of ¯scal policy in the context of averting currency crises
see Kopits (2000). He argues that 'vulnerability to crises can be mitigated by signalling a phased ¯scal
adjustment that involves credible implementation of key structural measures, in particular ¯scal policy
rules', p. 1.
17Buiter, W. H., and K. M. Kletzer (1991): \The Redundancy and Usefulness of Public
Debt," mimeo, Yale University.
(1992): \De¯cits: Which, How Much, and so What?," American Economic
Association Papers and Proceedings, 82(2), 290{294.
Bulir, A., and S. Moon (2003): \Do IMF-Supported Programs Help Make Fiscal Ad-
justment More Durable?," Working Paper 03/38, IMF.
Calvo, G. A., A. Izquierdo, and E. Talvi (2003): \Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange
Rate, and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," Working Paper 9828, NBER.
Cardoso, E., and A. Helwege (1992): Latin America's economy: Diversity, Trends
and Con°icts. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti, and N. Roubini (1999): \Paper Tigers? A Model of the
Asian Crisis," European Economic Review, 43, 1211{36.
Eichengreen, B., A. Rose, and C. Wyplosz (1995): \Exchange Market Mayhem:
the Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks," Economic Policy: A European
Forum, pp. 249{96.
Elmendorf, D. W., and N. G. Mankiw (1998): \Government Debt," Finance and
Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Frankel, J., and A. Rose (1996): \Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: an Empir-
ical Treatment," Journal of International Economics, 41, 351{66.
Girton, L., and D. Roper (1977): \A Monetary Model of Exchange Market Pressure,"
The American Economic Review, 67, 537{48.
Hutchison M., Noy, I. (2003): \Macroeconomic E®ects of IMF-Sponsored Programs
in Latin America: Output Costs, Program Recidivism and the Vicious Cycle of Failed
Stabilizations," Journal of International Money and Finance, 22, 991{1014.
Kaminsky, G., S. Lizondo, and C. M. Reinhart (1998): \Leading Indicators of
Currency Crises," International Monetary Fund Sta® Papers, 45, 1{48.
18Kopits, G. (2000): \How Can Fiscal Policy Help Avert Currency Crises," Working Paper
00/195, IMF.
Krugman, P. (1979): \A Model of Balance of Payments Crises," Journal of Money Credit
and Banking, 11, 311{25.
Kumar, M., U. Moorthy, and W. Perraudin (2002): \Predicting Emerging Market
Curency Crashes," IMF working paper, International Monetary Fund.
Levy-Yeyati, E. (2007): \Dollars, Debt, and International Financial Institutions: Dedol-
larizing Multilateral Lending," World Bank Economic Review, 21, 21{47.
Levy-Yeyati, E., and F. Sturzenegger (2005): \Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes:
Deeds vs. Words," European Economic Review, 49, 1603{35.
Mendoza, E. G., and P. M. Oviedo (2004): \Public Debt, Fiscal Solvency and Macroe-
conomic Uncertainty in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and
Mexico," Working Paper W10637, NBER.
Obstfeld, M. (1996): \Models of Currency Crises with Self-Ful¯lling Features," Euro-
pean Economic Review, 40, 1037{1047.
Ranciere, R., and O. Jeanne (2006): \The Optimal Level of International Reserves for
Emerging Market Countries: Formulas and Applications," Working Papers 229, IMF.
Reinhart, C. M., and K. S. Rogoff (2004): \The Modern History of Exchange Rate
Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 1{48.
Sachs, J., A. Tornell, and A. Velasco (1996): \Financial Crises in Emerging Mar-
kets: the Lessons from 1995," Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 147{215.
Seater, J. J. (1993): \Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Economic Literature, XXXI,
142{190.
Tovar, C. E. (2005): \International Government Debt Denominated in Local Currency:
Recent Developments in Latin America," BIS Quarterly Review, pp. 109{18.
19A List of countries
1. Argentina 2. Belize 3. Bolivia 4. Brazil 5. Chile 6. Colombia 7. Costa Rica 8. Do-
minica 9. Dominican Republic 10. Ecuador 11. El Salvador 12. Grenada 13. Guatemala
14. Guyana 15. Haiti 16. Honduras 17. Jamaica 18. Mexico 19. Nicaragua 20. Panama
21. Paraguay 22. Peru 23. St. Kitts and Nevis 24. St. Lucia 25. St. Vincent and the
Grenadines 26. Trinidad and Tobago 27. Uruguay 28. Venezuela, RB.
20